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Party for Ilinden People's National Movement for Macedonian Submission Партија за Илинденско народно национално движење за Македонско покорство
Abbreviation	PIND
President	Vasilko Uzunovski
Chairperson	Petre Neškoski
Secretary	Jane Jolov
Presidium	Vasilko Uzunovski Ivančo Klekovski Mihajlo Andrejev Teodor Naumovski Kosta Nikolov Jovan Slavjanoski
Vice-President	Kosta Nikolov
Founders	Vasilko Uzunovski Ivančo Klekovski Teodor Naumovski Kristijan Pelevski Aco Mudžoroski Dimitri Dimovski Angel Manasievski
Founded	13 November 2024
Legalised	December 27th 2024 (Constitutional court dicision)
Merger of	Integra and TMRO and dozen other smaller parties
Headquarters	Skopje
Student wing	Ilinden Student League
Youth wing	Ilinden national youth
Membership (2025)	117,532
Ideology	Right-wing populism Ultraconservatism Christian democracy Ultranationalism Traditionalism Albanophobia Ethnonationalism Euroscepticism Antifeminism Clericalism Nativism
Political position	Far-right
Religion	Macedonian orthodoxy
International affiliation	Europe of Sovereign Nations Group
Colours	Red   Gold
Slogan	Macedonia for the Macedonians
Assembly	12 / 120
Mayors	4 / 80
Local councils	93 / 1,333
Skopje city council	2 / 45
Party flag
Politics of North Macedonia Political parties Elections

The Party for Ilinden People's National Movement for Macedonian Submission (Macedonian: Партија за Илинденско народно национално движење за Македонско покорство), abbreviated as PIND (Macedonian: ПИНД), is a far-right ultraconservative political party in North Macedonia.

The party was established on November 13, 2024, as a far-right nationalist organization. The party claims its primary aim is to preserve and promote the traditions and political heritage of the Macedonian people. It emerged from a merger of a dozen smaller far-right Macedonian parties, primarily Integra and TMRO. Its formation took place in Skopje’s main square, sparking significant controversy due to allegations of promoting Albanophobia, Islamophobia, xenophobia, homophobia, transphobia, and misogyny. The party's platform was deeply conservative and nationalist, advocating solely for the preservation of Macedonian national identity and culture.

Initially, the party faced opposition when attempting to register, as the Macedonian State Election Commission banned it, citing concerns over its far-right ideologies. However, following a ruling by the Constitutional Court, the party was officially registered on December 27, 2024.

Under the leadership of Vasilko Uzunovski, the party promoted ultranationalist and ultraconservative identity politics in the form of antiquisation and christian democracy. Its nationalist stances were often also anti-Albanian. But nontheless their popularity skyrocketed and they polling was second only to the main VMRO-DPMNE.

History and Formation

The party was founded on November 13, 2024, through the merger of several smaller far-right nationalist groups in North Macedonia. Key founders included prominent figures from parties such as Integra and TMRO, who sought to unify various factions of the far-right movement under a single banner. Their motivation was to create a more powerful and cohesive force that could effectively advocate for the interests of ethnic Macedonians and promote a nationalist agenda.

The founding members were driven by a desire to reclaim what they perceived as a diminishing Macedonian identity amidst increasing multicultural influences and political concessions made in recent years. They viewed the 2018 Prespa Agreement, which resolved a long-standing naming dispute with Greece, as a betrayal of Macedonian sovereignty. In their view, the agreement undermined the legitimacy of the country’s identity and called into question the very essence of what it meant to be Macedonian.

The party held its inaugural rally in Macedonia Square in Skopje on the anniversary of Skopje's liberation from Bulgarian occupation. This date was deliberately chosen to symbolize a historical struggle against perceived oppression and to resonate with the party's nationalist rhetoric. Over 50,000 supporters turned out for the rally, marking a significant moment in the party's history and highlighting a growing dissatisfaction among segments of the Macedonian population.

Early Controversies

From its inception, the party faced significant controversy. During the founding rally, graffiti reading "Смрт на Шиптарите" (meaning "Death to the Shiptars," a derogatory term aimed at ethnic Albanians) was visible behind the speakers. The party leadership's decision to ignore this overtly racist message attracted widespread condemnation from human rights organizations and opposition parties. Critics accused the party of promoting hate speech and fostering division among ethnic communities in North Macedonia.

The party’s early platform was characterized by its calls for the annulment of the Prespa Agreement and the reintroduction of the death penalty for various political figures, including both former leaders and prominent Albanian politicians. This radical agenda positioned the party as a controversial entity in the Macedonian political landscape.

Challenges to Registration

Despite the fervent support at its founding, the party initially faced challenges in securing official registration. The Macedonian State Election Commission denied their application, citing concerns over the party’s far-right ideology and potential threats to public order. This setback was met with protests from supporters who argued that the denial was politically motivated and an infringement on their democratic rights.

In a pivotal turn of events, the party appealed to the Constitutional Court. On December 27, 2024, the court ruled in favor of the party, allowing it to officially register. This decision marked a significant victory for the party and galvanized its supporters, who viewed the ruling as a triumph for freedom of expression and national pride.

Growth and Political Impact

Following its official registration, the party quickly gained traction, especially among disenchanted voters from more established political factions, including VMRO-DPMNE. The party’s membership swelled as it tapped into a growing wave of nationalist sentiment in the country. Many former members of VMRO-DPMNE began defecting to the new party, further consolidating its base.

The party's radical stances, including its rejection of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which aimed to enhance the rights of the Albanian minority, and its opposition to the 2019 Law on Languages, gained popularity among those who felt marginalized by what they perceived as concessions to ethnic Albanians.

As the party’s influence grew, so did its willingness to engage in provocative rhetoric, often rallying supporters around slogans such as "Македонија на Македонците" (Macedonia for the Macedonians), which became emblematic of its nationalist agenda.

Current Status and Future Prospects

As of 2024, the party has established itself as a formidable player in North Macedonian politics, capitalizing on rising nationalist sentiment and dissatisfaction with the status quo. Its leadership has articulated plans to modernize the Macedonian military and police forces and restore the former national flag, signaling a clear departure from recent efforts at regional reconciliation.

The party's close ties to the Macedonian Orthodox Church have further fueled its conservative agenda, with promises to amend the constitution to recognize the Church as the official state religion, a move that would have profound implications for the secular nature of the state.

Despite facing criticism from all sides, including the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, the party's popularity continues to rise, attracting attention and concern both domestically and internationally. Speculation abounds regarding potential defections from other parties, which could significantly alter the balance of power in North Macedonia’s political landscape.

Controversies

Formation and Controversy

The party was officially founded on November 13, 2024, a symbolic date marking the anniversary of Skopje's liberation from Bulgarian fascist forces during World War II. The founding rally, which attracted over 50,000 supporters, flooded Skopje’s main square, turning it into a platform for a new, radical voice in North Macedonia’s political landscape. Amid the fervor, controversy erupted as a visible piece of graffiti reading "Смрт на Шиптарите" (Macedonian for "Death to the Shiptars", a derogatory term for ethnic Albanians) was seen behind the speakers. The party leadership, instead of addressing or condemning the racist message, chose to ignore it, further fueling public outrage.

Ideology and Political Stances

The party positions itself on the far-right, with its primary political objective being the annulment of the 2018 Prespa Agreement, which resolved the decades-long naming dispute between Greece and North Macedonia. This demand has become a rallying cry for supporters who view the agreement as a betrayal of Macedonian identity. The party also advocates for the reintroduction of the death penalty, controversially naming former Macedonian political leaders, including Zoran Zaev and Nikola Dimitrov, as targets, as well as prominent Albanian figures such as Ali Ahmeti, Zijadin Sela, and Talat Xhaferi, many of whom played roles during the 2001 Macedonian insurgency.

The party’s platform is seen as vehemently anti-Albanian, openly advocating for the deportation of over 45,000 ethnic Albanians who arrived in North Macedonia from Kosovo. It stands in staunch opposition to the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, which sought to ease ethnic tensions by increasing Albanian representation, and rejects the 2019 Law on Languages, which officially recognized Albanian as the second language of the state. The party further opposes the 2017 Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria and has condemned the French Proposal aimed at facilitating North Macedonia’s European Union accession. Furthermore, it has positioned itself against NATO membership, calling for Macedonia to adopt a neutral stance akin to that of Switzerland.

At their rallies, party leaders have chanted the provocative slogan "Македонија на Македонците" (Macedonian for "Macedonia for the Macedonians")—a phrase that has since become central to the party’s nationalist rhetoric and has been widely condemned for its exclusionary and divisive message.

Social Policies and Ties to the Orthodox Church

On social issues, the party maintains deeply conservative positions. It opposes abortion in all cases and has pledged to introduce legislation to enact a complete ban on the practice. The party’s ties to the Macedonian Orthodox Church are particularly strong, with leaders suggesting that if they were to assume power, they would amend the constitution to formally recognize the Church as the official state religion. Such a move would drastically alter North Macedonia's secular political framework and, if implemented, would make North Macedonia the second country in the world—after Greece—to enshrine an Orthodox Christian denomination in its constitution. This proposal has sparked widespread criticism, with opponents warning it would undermine religious pluralism and challenge the state’s commitment to secularism.

Patriarchy and Gender Criticism

The party's traditionalist stance extends to its views on gender roles, which has led many to accuse it of patriarchal and anti-feminist tendencies. With 87% of its leadership composed of men, critics argue that the party promotes a highly conservative vision of society, where traditional gender roles are emphasized, and progressive movements, particularly those advocating for women's rights, are actively opposed.

Popularity and Political Impact

Despite widespread criticism from across the political spectrum, including condemnation from the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, the party’s popularity has surged, particularly among far-right nationalists disillusioned with the mainstream conservative parties. Several former members of VMRO-DPMNE have already defected to the party, and there are persistent rumors that Members of Parliament may follow suit, potentially providing the party with its first official representation in the national legislature.

The party has also called for the reintroduction of mandatory military service, advocating for a significant expansion and modernization of North Macedonia's military and police forces. Leaders have further vowed to restore the country's former national flag, a move that would signal a sharp departure from recent efforts at reconciliation with neighboring countries. Perhaps most provocatively, the party has declared its intent to claim the entire geographical region of Macedonia, including areas in Greece and Bulgaria, as part of their vision for an expanded Macedonian state—a stance that threatens to escalate tensions in the already fragile Balkans region.

Political Breakthrough

In early 2025, PIND achieved significant political representation for the first time, both in North Macedonia’s Assembly and in local governance. The party, founded as a far-right nationalist movement, rapidly gained traction, drawing support from disaffected segments of the political landscape, particularly within the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party.

A major turning point came when Panche Toskovski, the Minister of Internal Affairs, resigned from his post and defected to PIND. Shortly thereafter, Stefan Andonovski, the Minister of Digitalization, also resigned and joined PIND. These high-profile defections marked a significant moment in North Macedonia's political scene, highlighting growing internal divisions within VMRO-DPMNE and the increasing appeal of PIND’s nationalist and anti-establishment platform.

Following these defections, PIND secured 12 seats in the Assembly, all through defections from VMRO-DPMNE members, positioning the party as the fifth-largest political force in the country. In addition to its success in the national legislature, PIND gained substantial influence at the local level, securing 93 local council members and seeing 4 mayors defect from VMRO-DPMNE to join its ranks. Furthermore, the party won two seats on the Skopje City Council, signaling its growing presence in the nation's capital.

PIND'S involvment with the 2025 Macedonian protests

In early 2025, North Macedonia experienced one of its largest political crises since its independence, as PIND, in alliance with The Left and a coalition of smaller parties and organizations, led a series of mass protests in Skopje. The protests were unprecedented in scale and intensity, with demonstrators demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski and his government, as well as the scheduling of early parliamentary elections to coincide with the local elections later that year.

The initial protests drew an estimated 330,000 people, making it one of the largest demonstrations in the country’s history. The movement was largely fueled by dissatisfaction with Mickoski’s government, particularly regarding issues of national identity and sovereignty. Protesters were predominantly nationalists, frustrated by the government’s continued commitment to the Prespa Agreement, which had officially renamed the country North Macedonia in 2018. Many Macedonians, especially within nationalist and conservative circles, viewed the name change as a betrayal of the country’s heritage and a concession to foreign interests.

A pivotal moment occurred during a televised address by Prime Minister Mickoski, in which he referred to the country as "North Macedonia" four times. This enraged the protesters, many of whom considered the use of the name a direct insult to Macedonian identity. In response, the size of the protests swelled to nearly 400,000 participants, with demonstrators arriving in Skopje from across the country. Chants of “Македонија на Македонците” (“Macedonia for the Macedonians”) echoed through the streets as the protests escalated, with demands broadening beyond early elections to include a reversal of policies related to the country’s identity, such as the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the recognition of Albanian as a second official language in certain areas.

In an effort to quell the unrest, the government deployed more than 8,000 police officers and paramilitary units to contain the situation. However, the protests soon descended into violent clashes between security forces and demonstrators. Protesters hurled rocks, Molotov cocktails, and other makeshift weapons at police, while the government forces responded with tear gas and rubber bullets. The violence reached its peak when demonstrators broke through police lines and stormed the Government Building in Skopje, which had been evacuated earlier in anticipation of the unrest. The protesters ransacked the building, destroying state documents and property associated with the "North Macedonia" identity, with Albanian-language materials specifically targeted.

The protests and violent clashes continued for nearly two months, resulting in 70 protesters and 105 police and military personnel losing their lives. Hospitals in Skopje were overwhelmed with over 15,000 injuries, and the authorities made 27,890 arrests. The widespread destruction of government buildings, public infrastructure, and private property left the capital in a state of disarray.

After weeks of escalating violence and growing public pressure, Prime Minister Mickoski announced his resignation. Aleksandar Nikolovski was appointed as the interim Prime Minister, tasked with leading the government until early parliamentary elections could be held later in 2025. The resignation of Mickoski marked a significant political victory for PIND and its allies, cementing their rise as a powerful force in Macedonian politics amidst one of the most turbulent periods in the country’s recent history.

Election results

Presidential elections

Election	Party candidate	Votes	%	Votes	%	Result
		First round		Second round
2029	N/A	0	0%	0	0%	Lost N
2034	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Elected Y
2039	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Lost N
2044	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Elected Y
2049	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Elected Y
2054	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Lost N
2059	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Lost N

Assembly elections

Election	Party leader	Vote		%	Seats	+/–	Position	Government
2028	N/A	N/A		N/A	0 / 120	16	2nd	Opposition
2032	N/A	N/A		N/A	0 / 120	18	1st	Government

See also

• List of political parties in North Macedonia

Further reading

• Mattioli, Fabio (2020). Dark Finance: Illiquidity and Authoritarianism at the Margins of Europe. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-1294-5.

External links

• Official website (in Macedonian)